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THE STATE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT: IDEOLOGIES AND AN AGENDA 
FOR THE 19908 
"We have left undone those things which we ought to have done. And we have 
done those things which we ought not to have done, And there is no health in 
us." The Book of Common Prayer 
IDEOLOGIES AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
To generalise about the state and rural development in the South is rash. Almost 
any statement needs qualification. It is difficult to talk in the same breath about, 
say, Angola and the Andaman Islands, Togo and Thailand, India and Iran, or 
Cyprus and Kampuchea. Nations vary physically, economically and socially, and 
are politically diverse. Within national boundaries there are regional differences, 
and within regions ethnic, social and economic differences between households 
and people. Any commentator is also influenced and limited by personal 
experience, in my case largely in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, on which 
this paper is based. 
These obvious problems have done little to inhibit the search for general policies 
and their dissemination. National policy-makers need laws and programmes for 
whole countries. Aid agencies with large budgets, especially the Banks, need 
packages to promote. Academics need ideologies to dissect and denounce. 
Institutions and their members need and seek shared values and concepts to 
sustain solidarity and to support effective activities, especially where they have 
direct responsibility for policy. And all these need a common language and set of 
concerns for dialogue and debate, for securing and legitimating flows of funds, 
and as a framework for thought and action. 
Historically, the fashions for ideologies, packages, and programmes in rural 
development have changed. In part, this reflects changing rural conditions. The 
community development ethos and programmes of the 1950s, and the stress on 
agricultural extension and the dissemination of innovations of the 1960s, look 
dated and wrong now, even naive, with their stress on cultural obstacles to 
change, on community self-help construction, and on early adopters and 
laggards. Yet in the conditions of the time, they fitted better than they do now. 
The lesson is to see ideology and action in context, not as constants, but as 
arising from and adapting to, as well as moulding, those conditions. In this view, 
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they are always likely to be out-of-date, always requiring an imaginative effort to 
be ahead of current convention. This could support a forced straining for 
originality, change for its own sake, and new fashions to sustain the market for 
consultants, advice, technical assistance, and research. What it should support 
is a continuous effort to see what best to do for the future. There will always be 
changing perceptions and policies. Given the centralisation of power and 
communications with which we live, we have to generalise; not to do so is to 
generalise by default. The problem is how to do it better. 
It is modestly in that spirit that this paper addresses the question of an agenda for 
state action in rural development in the 1990s. It approaches this with an 
historical view of neo-Fabian prescriptions of the 1970s and neo-liberal 
prescriptions of the 1980s, and then with a contemporary view, from below, of the 
rural conditions which both these have tended to miss. 
Neo-Fabians in the 1970s: redistribution with growth 
If the 1960s saw the zenith of national planning, the 1970s experienced only a 
slow decline. In a Fabian tradition, government organisation was seen as a 
principal instrument for action against poverty. In many countries national plans 
had high profiles, and set styles and patterns to be followed also at lower levels, 
in rural regions and districts. In both decades, in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
major and widespread attempts were made to prepare and implement district and 
even sub-district plans, with donor-supported integrated rural development 
projects following close behind. In South Asia, especially India, national 
programme followed national programme for rural development, to be 
administered through field bureaucracies. The pervading sense, supported by 
the best development wisdom of the time, was that government could and should 
do more. 
A good illustration is the volume Redistribution with Growth (Chenery et al. 
1974), a joint study by the Development Research Center of the World Bank and 
the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. Redistribution 
with Growth (RWG) was inspired by the thinking and experience of ILO 
Missions, notably to Colombia (1970), Sri Lanka (1971) and Kenya (1972), and 
especially by Sri Lanka's outstanding achievements in health and education. It 
was also influenced by India's directly administered rural programmes. 
Significantly, Kenya, which received and influenced one of the ILO Missions, was 
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closer to South Asian than to most African conditions in having a strong rural 
administration. Not surprisingly, direct administrative action by the state in rural 
development was taken for granted as a major mode of intervention. If not a 
Bible of development in the 1970s. RWG was at least a revered text, cheap (my 
copy cost UK pounds 1.40), accessible, and much prescribed and studied, as the 
heavily thumbed copies in the IDS library testify. 
RWG is a prospectus composed by humane economists, having a second go 
after the planning fantasies of the 1960s. The authors had learnt the lesson that 
rural elites tend to capture the benefits of government programmes. They sought 
solutions through targetting: there were to be rural target groups, and urban 
target groups. In targetting the rural poor, asset distribution through land reform 
was stressed, together with services specially, for small farmers, as in the 
statement that: 'A land reform which breaks the power of large farmers and the 
rural elite will...provide a framework within which public goods and services can 
be directed to the target groups with minimum leakage' (Ibid:l35). 
To provide these services, new organisations were suggested - 'wholly new 
institutions endowed with ample resources and the best cadres' (ibid:68). An 
Agency for Small Farmers would conduct a coordinated programme with a 
package combining credit, crop extension, crop insurance, and input supplies 
(ibid: 128-90). The faith in direct government action, and the socialist 
sympathies of the time, are reflected in the opportunities seen in Tanzania: 
...we would stress that the lack of rigidity in much of tropical Africa makes 
possible interventionist policies designed to create new forms of rural 
institutions, such as the ujamaa villages in Tanzania, which can provide for 
the more efficient use of public infrastructure, agricultural capital, and such 
government-supplied services as extension, health care, and education' 
(ibid:135). 
To reach and help the rural target groups, special institutions and programmes 
were needed. Economies, planning and the state were all seen in terms of 
growth. To do more for the poor, government must grow. The solution to rural 
poverty was not less government but more. 
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Neo-l iberal in the 1980s: structural adjustment without a human face 
If the 1970s were the decade of equity, the 1980s have been the decade of 
efficiency. This is not to assert how much or how little either equity or efficiency 
have been achieved, but to say that these have been prominent in rhetoric and 
ideology. Efficiency has been linked in neo-liberal prescriptions with freeing 
markets and slimming government. In the 1980s, especially in SSA. but perhaps 
excepting Botswana, state organisations have been seen as overgrown, 
inefficient, corrupt, and costly. The solutions advocated and introduced in 
structural adjustment packages have included devaluation, which raises 
agricultural incomes from exports, higher domestic prices for agricultural 
produce, derestricting food grain movement, and deregulation of prices. 
Government recurrent expenditure has been cut back, and parastatals shrunk or 
disbanded. Even among those who have opposed structural adjustment for its 
lack of concern for the poor - its lack of a human face - there has been a degree 
of acceptance that governments should do less in some respects in order to do 
better in others. 
A classic statement of neo-liberal prescriptions is Accelerated Development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: an Agenda for Action (The Berg Report) (World Bank 
1981). This sought more efficient use of scarce resources. In his Foreword, the 
President of the World Bank said that administrative and managerial capacity 
were the scarcest resources in all countries. In that context, the report 
suggested that African governments should examine ways in which public sector 
organisations could be operated more efficiently and more reliance could be 
placed on the private sector. In agricultural and rural development, this implied 
competitive private input supply and marketing, and user charges and cost 
recovery for services. The solution to the problems of development was not 
more government but less. 
Contrasts and Commonalit ies 
To polarise two schools of thought in this way is to simplify and even caricature: 
but it provides a basis for asking how they have been applied, what they have in 
common, and what they miss. 
4 
In rural development policy and its application, South Asia, especially India, 
contrasts with most of SSA in adhering to neo-Fabian approaches. It was, 
indeed, in India that some of the policies advocated in RWG originated, and 
where attempts to implement them have subsequently been most sustained. To 
my knowledge, India is alone among developing countries in its persistence with 
massive administered programmes targetted to individuals or households. These 
include the Small Farmers Development Agency (1971), Training Rural Youth for 
Self-Employment (1979), and the Integrated Rural Development Programme 
(1979), which latter continues in 1989 on a vast scale all over the country. In a 
neo-Fabian mode, rural development programmes in India have been 
standardised, subsidised, packaged and targetted. That the packages often do 
not fit and often miss their targets, are commonplaces of field observation: but 
the approaches and programmes are stable. There are several reasons for this: 
some programmes are protected by misleading evaluation surveys (for a 
perceptive critique see Dreze 1988); subsidised programmes play their part in 
local political patronage; the Indian Government, despite a rural population 
almost twice that of SSA, has had the financial and administrative means to 
persist with a rural development strategy in which field bureaucracies play a 
major part; the successes of the green revolution are seen by policy-makers as 
linked with the transfer of technology through agricultural extension and other 
services; and India has had the relative freedom from debt and aid dependence 
to be able to resist donor pressures to change its policies. In consequence. 
India's field bureaucracies show little sign of being eroded by neo-liberal 
thinking. 
In contrast, many of the countries of SSA, with their declining economies, heavy 
debts, large government organisations, and weak administrations, have evoked 
and been subject to the neo-liberal prescriptions of structural adjustment. Both 
the state and the market have shrunk back. With recurrent budgets squeezed by 
smaller revenues and the conditions required by the IMF, World Bank and other 
donors, existing field bureaucracies have been starved of resources, with the 
familiar tragedies of agricultural extension staff without tyres for their bicycles, 
schools without textbooks, clinics without drugs, and teachers and health staff 
without pay. With economies in decline, basic goods have become scarce and 
costly. In places it has been NGOs, rather than the market, that have filled the 
vacuum left by the decline in government services. In India, the state tries to 
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extend its activities to help the poor individually: in much of SSA, the state 
struggles simply to maintain some contact with them collectively and to sustain 
basic services. 
These contrasts conceal commonalities. The Neo-Fabian and neo-liberal 
prescriptions of RWG and of The Berg Report respectively have in common that 
both have been elaborated and propagated by economists and in association 
with the World Bank. The authors of RWG were all economists - Chenery, 
Ahluwalia. Bell, Duloy and Jolly (though Bell and Jolly at least had rural field 
experience). Berg was also an economist. It may be no coincidence that while 
the Berg Report criticised the size of government in SSA, the one part to be 
strengthened was planning - 'The appropriate response now is to reinforce the 
central planning agencies, and to endow them as quickly as possible with the 
investment evaluation capacities they need' (World Bank 1981:33). Both 
ideologies, and both sets of prescriptions, embody a planner's core, centre-
outwards, top-down view of rural development. They start with economies, not 
people; with the macro not the micro: with the view from the office, not the view 
from the field. And in consequence their prescriptions tend to be uniform, 
standard and for universal application. 
A Counter- Ideology of Reversals 
Centre-outwards, core-periphery views have their validity and strength: after all, 
since most power resides in the centre, it is in the centre that change can most 
readily be effected. But they also mislead unless complemented, qualified and 
offset by the reverse view, from the periphery, This amounts to a counter-
ideology to those generated and diffused from the cores, whether Marxist, 
socialist, structuralist, or neo-liberal, and whether red, pink, blue, or any other 
hue but certain shades of green. It is a counter-ideology which takes as its 
starting point the conditions and priorities of rural people, especially the poorer, 
and the problems and opportunities which they face; and it leads to a different 
constellation of prescriptions. 
The reversals have been elaborated elsewhere (Chambers 1983. 1987, I988a). 
The switch or flip of view can be recognised by reflecting on the normal 
meanings attributed by professionals to the word 'remote', a word as profoundly 
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as it is unconsciously urban-biased in elite usage; to a villager tar <:om town it is 
the town that is remote. The reversals are of location, learning, explanation, 
values, control, authority and power, to put first the poor and the periphery. 
When related to the role of the state in rural development, reversals provide an 
agenda for the 1990s. They point to two key aspects: first, the changing priorities 
of poorer rural people: and second, the conditions and behaviour of the 
government field staff with whom they interact. 
For any urban-based outsider to state the priorities of poor rural people is yet 
another core-based act of paternal guesswork. But not to attempt this is also an 
act by default. Any statements have to be subject to qualification and change; 
and one of the greatest unmet needs in rural development is a continuous, 
sensitive exercise to understand the conditions, strategies and priorities of the 
poorer. When this is undertaken (as shown by e.g. Beck 1989. Breman 1985. 
Corbett 1988, de Waal forthcoming, Heyer 1989, IDS 1989, Jodha 1988, Rahmato 
1987), the reality revealed can differ from beliefs commonly held by outsiders. 
Using these and other insights from fieldwork, my best inference is that many of 
the aspirations of poor rural people can be captured in the concept of secure and 
sustainable livelihoods, with access to basic goods and services, and freedom 
from fear and hassle. But priorities change, and differ; as the extended family 
and patron-client obligations have weakened, and as costs of services for health 
and education have risen, so command over assets to handle contingencies and 
buy services have become more important; and with rapid social and political 
change, and with more education and better communications, so self-respect 
has come to matter more. 
For their part, f ield-level government staff have similar aspirations. They are 
often committed to their professional work but lack resources for it. They want 
and often badly need to earn more. Promotion is usually out of the question. 
Especially in SSA, their salaries have typically declined in real terms, eroded by 
inflation. Quite often, they no longer provide even for a basic livelihood. In 
Eastern Uganda in 1987 the monthly salary of a nursing aid would buy one kilo of 
sugar and two loaves of bread, and it required two months' salary of a secondary 
school headmaster to buy a bicycle tyre (Whyte 1987:8-9). 
Faced with the need and desire to increase their earnings, field-level staff who 
do not resign or manage to move to urban centres have two main strategies: 
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i. moonlighting and daylighting. 
Clandestinely or openly, staff undertake economic activities. Farming and other 
self-employment are common. In part of Uganda in 1987 'agriculture was - for 
most professionals - the strategy of necessity which allowed them to remain 
professionals' (ibld:12). In Burkina Faso it is known, and in Sudan it is 
widespread, for government field staff to be paid officially approved salary 
supplements by NGOs to work on the NGOs' programmes. Some activities are 
moonlighting - illicit and concealed; others, in countries as different as Sudan 
and Vietnam, are daylighting, carried out openly because they are condoned. 
ii. extracting rents. 
The extraction of rents takes several forms: 
a. subsidies are shared. Subsidised programmes and inputs provide a 
surplus which can be creamed off. In India, for example, there are 
standard understandings of percentages for sharing the subsidies for 
purchasing IRDP milch buffaloes. 
b. services are sold. Many practices are known. In much of West Africa, 
government rural health services have been de facto privatised. There and 
elsewhere, whatever small amounts of drugs are supplied are sold by staff, 
operating what are in effect private dispensaries. Teachers are paid by 
parents for admitting children. Officials are paid for moving files or 
providing documents. Irrigation staff are paid for providing water. 
Examples are legion. 
c. rents are extorted. Frequently, government rules give local-level staff 
powers which they can use to extract rents. Poor people are blackmailed 
with threats of persecution or prosecution. Payments are demanded for 
waiving restrictions. At the field level there are then conflicts of interest 
between poor people and poorly paid staff. Moreover, the less poor often 
pay less while the poorer pay more. 
The perspectives of poor rural people, and the realities of field administration, are 
basic to the practical counter-ideology of reversals. This seeks to see things 
from the point of view of the poorer. In doing this, it is complementary to other 
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ideologies, not an alternative. Macro analysis will always be needed as well as 
micro. But when generating agenda and assessing policies, core professionals 
normally neglect what poor people want and need, or assume they know what it 
is, or treat it as a residual. A balanced view can only be gained, offsetting and 
correcting core-based ideologies and views, by putting first the priorities of 
those who are poorer and peripheral. 
In thinking through what the state should and should not do in the 1990s. three 
approaches help. The first is to learn lessons from the failures and successes of 
the past two decades. The second is a stance of eclectic pluralism, open to a 
mix of ideas. The third is this counter view, of reversals, starting with the 
perspectives of the poorer. The prescriptions which follow may fit neo-liberal 
tendencies in saying what the state should not do, and neo-Fabian tendencies in 
saying what it should do; but they do not depend on either philosophy. Based 
on reversals, they stand on their own. 
WHAT THE STATE MUST DO 
(All can read this part) 
Three universal functions of the state are fundamental for the rural poor. It must 
do the following: 
i. maintain peace and the democratic rule of law 
The appalling suffering and poverty resulting from civil disturbance and war is so 
obvious that it is easily underestimated. The fear, pain and anguish; the 
destruction, theft or loss of property; the insecurity of tenure; the disincentive to 
invest; the danger of loss of crops; the weak labour power when adults are 
fighting, guarding or killed; the interruptions to education; the disruption of 
services; the distress migration and destitution of refugees - any listing of bad 
effects can start with these and continue with many more. The record of the 
1970s and 1980s includes Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Iran, Iraq, Kampuchea, Laos, Lebanon, Mozambique, Namibia, Palestine, 
Rhodesia (as it was),Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tibet, Tigray, Uganda, Vietnam, West Irian 
and Western Sahara, without even starting on Latin America. 
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The democratic rule of law is also fundamental. In some radical circles in the 
1970s, democracy was seen as a form of Western cultural imperialism, and 'law 
and order' were dirty words associated with oppressive police action. Law can 
indeed favour the rich and the exploiters. Where force and intimidation prevail, 
as in much of Bihar, the poorest suffer. Where laws give power to petty officials, 
they may abuse it. It is the fairly administered rule of democratic law, and 
accessible justice for the poor, that matter. 
Colin Leys once wrote on the primacy of politics (in Seers and Joy eds. 1971). 
One can add the primacy of peace, and of fair laws and justice for the poor. 
ii. provide basic infrastructure and services 
Fiscal management of revenues and budgets is again fundamental. Beyond and 
based on that is the provision and maintenance of basic amenities to serve rural 
areas, such as trunk roads, railways, secondary and often primary schools, 
community and preventive health care, agricultural and veterinary extension, 
water supplies, weights and measures inspectorates, and in some areas 
telephones and electricity. Often, these are beyond the power of local 
communities to command and install or of the market to provide. NGOs, it is 
true, especially in some of the more afflicted states of SSA such as Sudan, have 
increasingly complemented and substituted for the state, and may do so even 
more in future. But the state remains the logical long-term institution to provide 
and maintain much of a country's basic infrastructure and services. 
iii. manage the economy 
Managing the economy, both externally and internally, is accepted by all except 
anarchists to be a legitimate and necessary function of the state, though views 
differ sharply on what and how much it should do. These issues are the subject 
of other essays, but three points relating to the rural poor can be noted. 
First, the debate on pricing policy for agriculture (see Harvey 1988) has not 
generated simple feasible policies applicable worldwide, given the conflicts of 
interest between poor rural producers and poor urban consumers; but higher 
prices for agricultural produce have often proved powerful means of enhancing 
the wellbeing of most poor rural people. 
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Second, parastatals for production support and marketing present a spectrum of 
monopoly and competition, and of performance. At one extreme is inefficient, 
overgrown and corrupt monopoly. Some West African marketing boards in the 
1960s and 1970s are one example. Another is the introduction of monopoly 
government organisations in some parts of India to market the minor forest 
products gathered by tribals. This was designed to bypass contractors who paid 
little. In effect, though, it merely introduced another stage in marketing with its 
own costs, with the result that the tribals received even less than before (pers 
comm. N.C.Saxena). In such conditions, it is common for field staff to gain power 
which they use to extract rents. Near the other end of the spectrum is the degree 
of democratic control and efficiency in marketing organisations achieved in 
Zimbabwe (Thomson 1988). The question has to be asked, case by case, 
whether in the real, local world, poor rural people will be better or worse off with a 
parastatal marketing organisation. Sometimes, but not always, the best solution 
may be plural, with a competitive private sector but a government agency 
providing a floor price. 
Third, from the point of view of the rural poor, managing the economy entails 
much more than just ensuring growth, good prices and marketing: it also 
includes providing conditions with access to food and to basic goods at 
affordable prices, a function which some states in SSA have failed to fulfil. 
AN AGENDA FOR ABSTENTION 
(Neo-liberals can read this part) 
The neo-liberal critique of state intervention in the economy has included the 
size and inefficiency of government bureaucracy and of parastatals, with 
prescriptions that the state should do less and the market more. A full review of 
the scope for limiting or reducing state intervention to make things directly better 
or less bad for the poor would require a book of its own. Here, some illustrations 
must suffice, proceeding from the more to the less obvious and recognised. 
i. forced collective agriculture and villagisation 
Were it not for continuing attempts to maintain collective agriculture, as in North 
Korea and Ethiopia, this paragraph would be unnecessary. Only, it seems, with 
exceptional and voluntary ideological commitment, as with some of the kibbutzim 
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in Israel, can producer cooperatives work at all well; and even the kibbutzim have 
had problems of sustainability. That the USSR, China and Vietnam have been 
reversing collectivisation is a recognition of the ultimate force of what most 
people want. That the USSR is finding the reversal difficult is an indication of the 
powerful inertia of vested bureaucratic interests once institutions have been 
established. In SSA, producer cooperatives have been more important in 
ideological debates than in economic reality (Hedlund 1988:12), and have 
performed badly; even ujamaa, the simple and limited form of collectivisation 
attempted in Nyerere's Tanzania,and remarked on positively in RWG, did not 
work. 
Villagisation induced by degrees of force has often been linked with 
collectivisation, as in Ethiopia, North Korea and Tanzania, and as now proposed 
for parts of Zimbabwe. The pros and cons have been the subject of much 
debate. The official motives are often a desire to control a disgruntled and 
dispersed peasantry. Against the officially listed advantages of better access to 
services must be set higher health risks from population concentrations, loss of 
control over and protection of land, including productive micro-environments, 
and loss of incentives to invest in more sustainable agriculture. Most important 
of all, villagisation is rarely what people want. 
It seems inherent in the contemporary human condition for most rural people to 
seek a secure and independent land-based livelihood where resources are 
controlled and commanded by the family and where returns are directly linked to 
efforts. With secure tenure and rights to land, livestock and trees, farm families 
tend to take the long view and invest in sustainable agriculture (Chambers 1987). 
Without it. they take the short view and environmental degradation often follows. 
Not only are collectivisation of agriculture and forced villagisation undesirable as 
forms of core-based, top-down, ideological and political paternalism, which puts 
rural people's priorities last: they are also environmentally unsound. 
ii. shining islands of salvation 
Islands of salvation are small projects which receive special support and 
attention. Most governments deceive themselves and the international 
community through visits to these privileged entities, and through superficial 
reports and studies. Mick Moore cites the water cooperatives on canal irrigation 
in Gujarat, supposed by an international authority (Repetto 1986) to buy water 
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wholesale on a volumetric basis. However, almost all evidence of these 
cooperatives traces back to a single small project: the accessible, heavily 
subsidised, closely administered, and frequently visited Mohini Water 
Cooperative Society; and sustained searches by academic sleuths elsewhere in 
Gujarat have drawn an almost complete blank. The outcome is prescriptions 
which, as Moore shows, are physically and administratively infeasible, and worse, 
which distract attention from the main priorities for the poor. These are better 
management of canal main systems to improve supplies to the underprivileged at 
the tails. Or again, much of the insight and understanding about the progress 
and feasibility of ujamaa villages in Tanzania in the late 1960s was based on 
repeated visits to and articles about three special cases - the Ruvuma 
Development Association, Mbambara, and Upper Kitete. Generalising from these 
exceptional examples helped to mislead policy-makers into a disastrous decade 
of trying to do what poor rural people did not want. 
iii. borderl ine big projects 
Not all big projects in rural development are bad. Few would wish to argue that 
the rural poor of Egypt would have been better off if the Aswan dam had not been 
built. Big infrastructure is sometimes needed, and indivisible. The case for heavy 
investments in communications and in power can be strong. There may also be 
a case for some large-scale flood control works, for example in the watersheds 
that flow into Bangladesh. 
That said, the case against big new rural development projects has strengthened. 
Completing current projects, and maintenance and cost-covering for those 
completed, are often higher priorities than new construction. Complex projects 
have also tended to do badly. The World Bank's frank, sober and sobering 
evaluation of its experience with rural development from 1965-86 found an 
uneven record. Area development projects did worst, especially in SSA, leading 
to the comment that 'That form of area development project which came to be 
known as "integrated rural development" (that is, a multicompetent project 
involving two or more agencies) performed so poorly as to raise questions about 
the utility of that approach in many situations' (World Bank 1988: xvi). While 
irrigation projects outside Africa did better, the position has changed now that 
many of the best sites have already been exploited. Those that remain tend to 
require the displacement of larger numbers of people, and they are often poor 
and politically impotent. The record with resettlement and compensation of 
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oustees (though improving under pressures from the World Bank) is so bad that 
big projects are still likely to mean many poor losers. And when their livelihoods 
are given due weight in the calculus of gains and losses, appraisals are liable to 
be more negative. 
Iv. standard packages for diverse condit ions 
Normal bureaucracy centralises, standardises and simplifies. In capital cities, 
programmes are designed for whole countries and orders issued for 
implementation, regardless of diverse conditions. Targets, too. are set centrally 
and disaggregated to regions, districts and subdistricts. where they often make 
no sense. Agricultural extension, at its near-worst, promotes the same package 
of practices in different agro-climatic zones. Health services supply the same 
drugs to clinics regardless of local and seasonal incidence of diseases. Such 
standardisation fails to serve the public, demoralises staff, and has again and 
again been found wanting. 
v. controls which harm or exclude the poor 
Many controls which make sense to central policy-makers in practice harm the 
rural poor. The administrative reflex is to control and regulate for the common 
good; but with astonishing frequency, across a wide range of countries, 
conditions and domains, such control and regulation hurts the poor. Some 
examples can make the point: 
* movement restrict ions hinder work seeking. For refugees, restrictions on 
movement imposed by host countries can prevent migration essential for 
livelihood, and weaken their bargaining power when they do move, since 
employers can threaten to turn them over to the police. In consequence, their 
employment is less secure, their wages liable to be lower, and the danger greater 
of not being paid at all. More generally, freedom of movement for the landless 
and for poor rainfed farmers can be essential to permit migration to fill in seasonal 
gaps in work. 
4 effective nationwide price controls on scarce basic goods hurt the rural 
poor. Where the controls are effective, as in Zambia in 1980, it does not pay for 
rural traders to stock goods since they cannot cover transport costs and risks. 
Goods then stay in towns. Urban people have better access, and rural black 
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markets, it supplied at all, have higher mark ups (ILO/JASPA 1981). Attempts by 
a central government to stamp out a black market, as with basic goods like 
paraffin, sugar, oil, rice and (lour in Darfur in Sudan in 1984, only further push up 
the black market prices (Diab 1988:44). The rural poor pay more or get nothing. 
* restricted movement of food crops creates local seasonal shortages which 
the market cannot relieve. In Ethiopia in 1987, where such regulations prevailed, 
the price of sorghum at Degan market, on the main tarmac road from Addis 
Ababa to Assab, reportedly rose to three times its price at harvest, the highest 
prices being at just the time when poor people were having to eat less at fewer 
meals. 
* regulations for minimum distances between tubewells in some parts of 
India protect the privileged access of those who sink tubes first. The restrictions 
do not deter the better off who have independent sources of credit: they can 
ignore the rules and go ahead anyway. The restrictions do exclude precisely the 
poorer who need institutional credit which requires that the regulations be 
observed. As so often, the haves have access denied to the have-nots (Tushaar 
Shah, pers. comm.). 
* prohibi t ions on cutt ing trees on private land, and on their transport and 
sale deter planting, especially by poorer farmers who cannot handle contractors 
and the bureaucracy. In many countries, but on the largest scale in India, farmers 
are either prohibited from cutting trees on their land, or require permissions to do 
so. This means that even if farmers are able to cut, transport and market their 
trees, they get less for them. Of 12 cases reported by N.C.Saxena (Chambers, 
Saxena and Shah 1989) of sales of trees or tree products in India, the highest 
receipt by the seller was 43 per cent of the disposal price, while in eight cases it 
was less than 20 per cent, among which three were less than 10 per cent. 
Cutting and transit restrictions were a major factor in price formation. Sellers 
were in a weak bargaining position, having to rely on the contractors who bought 
their trees to make the necessary side payments to the authorities. Though 
intended to conserve the environment to benefit all, restrictions on cutting, 
transport and sale discriminate against the poorer and weaker, induce them to 
cut and sell while they can. and discourage them from replanting. Poor people's 
private trees are savings, but in these conditions they can only cash them on bad 
terms. To restrict harvest, transit and sale is like a bank manager refusing 
withdrawals; not surprisingly this inhibits deposits - tree planting - especially by 
15 
the poorer. There is probably no measure so easy, quick and vast in impact, and 
which would help poorer farmers and the environment more, than the abolition of 
such rules. 
Restrictions such as these - on movement of people, on retail prices for scarce 
basic goods, on movements of food grains, on sinking tubes for groundwater, 
and on the harvest, transit and sale of private trees - are manifestations of the 
disabling state. Whatever their intentions, in practice such rules impoverish and 
deprive the rural poor - by loss of opportunities for earning: by denial of access 
to productive resources; by disincentives for saving; by less to buy and higher 
prices: and by the hassles, uncertainties and costs of dealing with rent-seeking 
officials or those who can pay them off. Those who are less poor and more 
influential can flout or bypass regulations, while the poorer are excluded, or have 
to pay. Not always, but all too often, restricted access and imperfect markets 
penalise poor rural people. Again and again, they want the state off their backs. 
One of the quickest and easiest ways for the state to help poor rural people on a 
large scale is to abolish damaging restrictions, to dismantle the disabling state. 
For neo-liberals who want the state to wither more than somewhat, these points 
may warm the heart. They should provide an acceptable and practical agenda. 
But let them not relax and rejoice too soon, for there is more to come. 
AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 
(Neo-Fabians can read this part) 
i. normal bureaucracy: doing the do-ab le 
Since field bureaucracies normally centralise, standardise and simplify, it is 
commonsense to give them tasks for which these tendencies are strengths. 
These are of two types. 
The first is where a standard receiving environment can be found or created, 
suitable for a standard input. Immunisation for people or livestock is an example, 
with simple one-off inputs into the closely controlled and predictable 
environment of the human or animal body. To differing degrees the GOBI 
(growth charts, oral rehydration, breast feeding, and immunisation) programmes 
promoted by UNICEF lend themselves to simple repetition, and have scored 
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successes in child welfare even in bad economic conditions such as those in 
Zimbabwe in 1982 4 (Cornia et al. 1987:290). Sometimes, too. uniform 
environments can be created, as when irrigation and fertiliser modify the (arm 
environment to fit green revolution genotypes. 
The second feasible task for normal field bureaucracies is the transfer or supply 
of technology which is robust and usable in a wide range of conditions. In India, 
the Technology Missions based in the Prime Minister's office have stressed high 
quality blackboards and good handpumps. Blackboards and handpumps can be 
designed and made to work well almost anywhere, given schools and 
groundwater respectively. It is again the do-able that is being done. 
ii. safety nets 
Almost all poor people, including many of the ultra poor or near-destitute, 
struggle hard, even desperately, to avoid becoming even poorer: but they are 
vulnerable to contingencies. When bad years and disasters strike, they are 
further impoverished, whether through sale of assets, new debts, new 
obligations, or physical disability. Big health care costs are one new threat to the 
poor who have a sick relative: they can impoverish utterly, reinforcing the case 
for effective free or cheap treatment. Once impoverished by loss of productive 
assets, say in a famine, recovery is hard. To help those who have become 
poorer to claw back to their previous condition is costly and difficult, although 
there have been successes, as shown by experience with OXFAM-supported 
restocking programmes for pastoralists in Kenya (Moris 1988). In general, 
though, it is likely to be much more cost effective, as well as more humane, to 
provide safety nets to help poor people avoid becoming poorer in the first place. 
Measures to do this are many. They include: public works and food for work 
programmes, among which the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme 
provides a model in which groups of people can demand work paid at the 
minimum wage: early interventions to keep food prices down and incomes up at 
bad times, for example by buying at good prices whatever poor people decide to 
sell (livestock, jewellery, charcoal etc); when famine threatens, food or other 
relief provided early enough to prevent the poorer having to dispose of their 
assets, together with clean water and immunisation (de Waal 1989); and at all 
times, effective preventive and curative health services available free or at low 
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cost. Also, wherever the state has the resources and capacity, and social 
supports are feeble, there is a case for help for the destitute and indigent, as 
provided for widows in some Indian states. 
The weaker the state, the greater the part NGOs can have to play; but in most 
countries, at most times, it is to the state that the safety net role falls. 
iii. changing rules 
The micro perspective, from below, can reveal scope for gains by the poorer from 
changing rules. Tushaar Shah's fieldwork on groundwater markets in India, 
coupled with economic analysis, led to a switch of electricity charging policy in 
Gujarat, from pro rata to graduated per horsepower rates. This resulted in 
between 1.5 and 2 mn buyers of irrigation water (generally the poorer and smaller 
farmers) paying 25 and 60 per cent less to sellers (Chambers. Saxena and Shah 
1989). The question is whether this was a unique opportunity, or whether other 
fieldwork and analysis could reveal other simple changes with similar vast, quick 
impact. At the very least, micro-level investigation merits attention to search for 
other potentials. 
iv. secure rights and information 
The poorer people are, the more they need secure rights. To enjoy their rights, 
they need to know what they are and how to claim them. They also often need 
organisation and solidarity to overcome vested interests. Two aspects can 
illustrate the potential here. 
First, where restrictions are abolished, the changes must be credibly known. In 
India a forester has told me that although in law no restrictions on movement of 
certain trees applied, the Forest Department pretended to the public that they 
did. A first step in the reversal of power needed in such a case is information, 
and then encouragement, through countervailing organisation, and even through 
changes in the judicial system, for people to claim their rights, resist extortion, 
and eliminate hassle. 
Second, for resource-based livelihoods to be sustainable, rights and access to 
the resources must be secure. Without secure tenurial rights, groups and 
families lack the incentive for long-term investment in land, water, pasture, soils 
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and trees. In practice, it is precisely the more fragile environments - forests, 
uplands, swamps, wetlands, semi-arid savannahs, and arid pastures - disparate 
though they are ecologically, where tenure is least secure and least exclusive. 
Urban-based interests sometimes seek to gain or maintain open access and to 
deny exclusive tenurial rights to communities or individuals: and this can 
reinforce the common failure in central places of policy-making to recognise the 
importance of secure tenure to those who seek their livelihoods in such remote 
and ecologically vulnerable areas. 
Communication of their rights to poor and scattered rural people is perhaps the 
most promising frontier for the state in rural development in the 1990s. In 
contrast with earlier decades, it will be easier to inform peripheral people about 
changes in regulations and rights. The revolution in communications is already 
reaching the most remote places. Using multiple channels - radio, television, 
video, newspapers, handbills, noticeboards, meetings - public information and 
public consultations will be more credible and convincing. It will be harder to 
mislead the poor at the local level. The benign state cannot be assumed, and 
communications can be used for many bad purposes. Where, though, there is 
central desire to inform and empower through credible and correct information, 
the means to do so will more and more be there. Communications are a 
cornerstone of an enabling state. 
REVERSALS, DIVERSITY AND THE ENABLING STATE 
The prescriptive paradigm of reversals for rural development is neither neo-
Fabian nor neo-liberal. Nor is it just eclectic pluralism. Putting poor rural people 
first provides starting points which are at once dispersed, diverse and 
complicating. Linear teleology in development thinking has long since fallen 
from favour (for critiques see e.g. Nette 1969 and Streeten 1983:881-3) but 
linear measures of development along scales (per caput GNP, infant mortality 
rate, female literacy...) persist as universal tools of assessment and comparison. 
They are needed, but they condition analysts to think in linear terms. In contrast, 
field-level realities - whether ecosystems, farming systems, or livelihood 
strategies - are non-linear, adaptive and differentiating. For some professionals, 
development is still, consciously or unconsciously, seen as convergent: in the 
paradigm of reversals, development is decentralised and divergent. While 
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normal bureaucracy and normal markets centralise, standardise and simplify, it is 
in contrast by becoming more complex and diverse that ecosystems and 
livelihood strategies become more stable and more sustainable. 
Near the core of this paradigm is decentralised process and choice. One 
expression of this is farmer participatory research for resource-poor agriculture 
(Farrington and Martin, 1988; Chambers, Pacey and Thrupp, 1989). This is 
coming to stress not the transfer of technology in the form of packages of 
practices for the uniform, simple, controlled environments of the irrigated green 
revolution, but provision of baskets of choices for the more diverse, complex and 
risk-prone farming systems of rainfed agriculture. Bureaucratic reversals are 
implied, with varied local requests passed up from farmers replacing pre-set 
technologies passed down to them. Approaches which put farmers' analysis and 
priorities first complement those which generate and transfer technology. In this 
mode, the state is not school but cafeteria, and development is decentralised, 
becoming not simpler but more complex, and not uniform but more diverse. 
The paradigm of reversals takes us even further; for it resolves the contradiction 
between the neo-Fabian thesis that the state should do more, and the neo-
Liberal antithesis that the state should do less. In terms of this paradigm, the 
state has often done those things which it ought not to have done, and has left 
undone those things which it ought to have done. The patterns vary and diverge. 
In much of SSA the state has been so weakened that it has retracted too far, and 
made errors of omission. In India it has extended too far, and made errors of 
commission. The worst mistakes have been rules and restrictions which give 
field-level staff power to extract rents from the weak. Here a new neo-liberal 
agenda can liberate the poor by abolishing the regulations used to exploit them. 
The task is to dismantle the disabling state. In parallel, there is more that the 
state can and should do. Here a new neo-Fabian agenda can decentralise while 
providing safety nets, secure rights and access to reliable information, and 
permitting and promoting more independence and choice for the poor. The task 
is to establish the enabling state. For both these new agendas, the unifying 
theme is reversals, to put first the diverse priorities of poor people. To 
understand and support these is equitable - helping people gain what they want, 
efficient - mobilising their creative energy, and sustainable - providing incentives 
for long-term self-reliant investments by the poor. The vision is then of a state 
which is not only protector and supporter, but also enabler and liberator; and of 
the 1990s as a decade for equity and efficiency through reversals and diversity. 
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